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COMPARED TO WHAT? THE UCLA
COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW PROJECT AND
THE FUTURE OF COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW
H.W. Arthurst
I. INTRODUCTION
Progressive politicians, scholars, civil servants, and ordinary
citizens in Europe and North America have been comparing each
other's experience with labor and social policy since at least the late
nineteenth century.' This progressive and internationalist tradition in
comparative labor studies, epitomized by the work of the pioneering
American industrial relations scholar, John R. Commons,2 clearly
influenced the UCLA Comparative Labor Law project However, it
was the fate of the UCLA project to be conducted during the dozen or
so critical years (1965-1978) when the New Deal's progressive legacy
in industrial relations was entering its terminal phase, when the state's
role in labor market regulation was being radically redefined, when
traditional understandings concerning the nexus between state and
law were being brought into question, when the nature of law and
legal research was being hotly debated, and when the hitherto staid
discipline of comparative law was beginning to experience significant
intellectual destabilization-partly at the hands of the very labor
t University Professor Emeritus and President Emeritus, York University. I have
benefited from Claire Mumm6's helpful research assistance, and from the insightful comments of
Peer Zumbansen and Katherine Stone.
1. DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE
AGE (1998).
2. Rodgers recounts how the walls of Commons' seminar room at the University of
Wisconsin, Madison were festooned with summaries of foreign labor laws, many of which had
been translated by his students. Studies by Commons, his colleagues and students provided a
foundation for some important New Deal labor legislation. RODGERS, supra note 1, at 31.
3. Their published books included DISPUTE SETILEMENT PROCEDURES IN FIVE
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (Benjamin Aaron ed., 1969); K.W. WEDDERBURN & P.L.
DAVIES, EMPLOYMENT GRIEVANCES AND DISPUTE PROCEDURES IN BRITAIN (1969); LABOR
COURTS AND GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE (Benjamin Aaron ed., 1971);
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY (Benjamin Aaron & Kenneth
William Wedderburn eds., 1972); DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: A STUDY OF SIX
COUNTRIES (Folke Schmidt ed., 1978).
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lawyer who had inspired the UCLA project.4 This makes the UCLA
project a worthy subject of study in its own right, and at the same time
provides an opportunity to assess the impact of these traumatic
developments on the broader discipline of comparative labor law.
II. THE UCLA COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW PROJECT IN
RETROSPECT
Comparative scholarship confronts a threshold problem: how can
scholars overcome the implicit bias, and sometimes explicit
condescension, which results from using the system they know best as
a lens with which to examine "other" systems? The UCLA project-a
series of studies on the legal regulation of industrial conflict, dispute
resolution, and workplace discrimination-sought to overcome this
problem by mobilizing a team of senior scholars from six countries,
each of whom assumed responsibility for a report on his own national
system as well as contributing to a thematic or integrative study.' This
strategy, conceived and sustained by the project's organizer, Benjamin
Aaron, was only partly successful. As he suggests in his candid
"personal appraisal" of the project,6 international collaboration
amongst legal scholars is difficult even if they work in the same field
and share a general disposition towards their subject. In preparing the
first series of studies, he notes, the six participants spent three months
at UCLA "in a more or less continuous colloquium. . .. " Anyone
who has engaged in earnest exchange with colleagues for three hours
or three days knows that the longer one seeks common ground, the
more steeply it falls away. After three months, it is a wonder that any
common ground remained at all.
Moreover, even good faith, collaborative efforts to avoid
ethnocentrism, to approach all comparator systems on an equal basis,
may founder if the participants do not inhabit the same academic
4. Benjamin Aaron, who initiated the UCLA project, claims to have been inspired to
undertake it by Otto Kahn Freund. Kahn Freund, an English academic and former German
labor court judge, was also a distinguished comparativist. His influential, and controversial, 0.
Kahn-Freund, On the Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1974) were an
important early contribution to the anti-formalist movement in comparative law. See also C.
Summers, American and European Labor Law: The Use and Usefulness of Foreign Experience,
16 BUFFALO L.R. 210 (1966).
5. The participants were Benjamin Aaron (United States), Xavier Blanc-Jouvan (France),
Gino Guini (Italy), Thilo Ramm (Germany), Folke Schmidt (Sweden), and K.W. Wedderburn
(United Kingdom).
6. Benjamin Aaron, The Comparative Labor Law Group: A Personal Appraisal, 2 COMP.
LAB. L.J. 228 (1977).
7. Benjamin Aaron, Foreword, in K.W. WEDDERBURN & P.L. DAVIES, EMPLOYMENT
GRIEVANCES AND DISPUTE PROCEDURES IN BRITAIN vi (1969).
COMPARED TO WHAT?
cultures or share the same intellectual premises. Take, by way of
example, the exchange between Aaron as editor, and Wedderburn
(and his collaborator, Davies) as authors. Wedderburn and Davies
were supposed to contribute a chapter to a collective study on dispute
resolution; instead they produced an entire book, to Aaron's
understandable dismay as project coordinator and editor.8 "We write
as lawyers," said Wedderburn and Davies in their introduction;9 "they
have given us a sociological as well as legal analysis" rejoined Aaron
in his preface.'" "Doubtless, many American and British readers will
disagree with some or all of the views expressed by Wedderburn and
Davies" ventures Aaron;" Wedderburn and Davies do not seem self-
conscious about expressing their "views" but did acknowledge that "it
may well seem odd" to English readers that they should have
embarked on the study at all, while Americans "will probably be
startled by the picture revealed."12
The substantive issues canvassed in this exchange between
Aaron, the American project organizer, and the two British authors
were, as it happens, familiar to all students of comparative labor law
scholarship. On the one hand, even though the United States and the
United Kingdom have much in common, differences in their industrial
relations systems and legal cultures caused Wedderburn and Davies to
anticipate different reactions to their book in the two countries
ranging from bemusement to astonishment. This reminds us that
comparativists have a responsibility not merely to convey information
about legal rules but to contextualize it; and not merely to
contextualize it but to do so in ways which are comprehensible to
readers who are encountering that context at a distance and for the
first time.
On the other hand, Aaron focuses on a different concern, the
contested boundary between law and sociology. In this he was
prescient; as we will see, the opening of law to the social sciences has
come to play a crucial role in the reinvention of comparative law.
However, his reference to the influences of the social sciences was
somewhat opaque. Like most academic lawyers of the period, Aaron
disavowed, perhaps mistrusted, theory. "I initiated .. .our projects
with few theories. . . .", he said. 3 His present-day successors in the
8. Aaron, supra note 6, at 230.
9. WEDDERBURN & DAVIES, supra note 3, at xii.
10. Aaron, supra note 7, at vi.
11. Id. at viii.
12. WEDDERBURN & DAVIES, supra note 3, at xii
13. Aaron, supra note 6, at 234
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field of comparative labor law would not likely be so diffident.
According to one distinguished scholar, the proliferation, elaboration,
and entrenchment of theoretical perspectives has grown to the point
where it arguably impedes discourse amongst legal scholars, let alone
collaboration.14
Indeed, perhaps Aaron himself was less diffident than his
disclaimer would suggest. He began his project, he says, with a strong
"working hypothesis" that was "conclusively confirmed"
namely that institutional arrangements for the conduct of labor-
management relations are products of the unique geographic,
demographic, historical, political, economic and social factors
within each country; they cannot be transplanted to alien soil. A
study of the systems that evolved in other countries, however, like
the exploration of outer space, teaches us much about our own
country (or world) because it gives us a different perspective from
which to view it. As a consequence, we ask different questions
about our own system, questions it would otherwise have never
occurred to us to ask.
15
On close examination, Aaron's "working hypothesis" actually
incorporates a number of sophisticated, if inexplicit, theoretical
positions: that "institutional arrangements" -presumably including
both labor law and other forms of law-are ultimately shaped by
"unique . . . social factors within each country"; that law therefore
logically lacks the capacity to transform itself or society; that
understandings of the nature and function of law are grounded in
variable and particular, rather than immutable and universal,
"perspectives"; that departures from conventional internal analyses of
law are consequently legitimate and necessary; and that asking
"different questions" is what sets comparative legal scholarship apart
from more parochial approaches.
This "working hypothesis" also has important methodological
implications for comparative law. If "unique . . . social factors"
produce a country's labor law, then knowledge of these factors is
surely indispensable for comparative analysis. This new and necessary
dimension of comparative law surely explains Aaron's insistence that
"law professors need to do more interdisciplinary research, especially
with the social sciences." 6 However, Aaron confesses that not only
did he initiate the project with "few theories," but that he possessed
"even less factual information about the foreign countries included in
14. Matthew Finkin, Reflections on Labor Law Scholarship and its Discontents: The
Reveries of Monsieur Verog, 46 U. MIAMI L.R. 1101 (1992).
15. Aaron, supra note 6, at 234
16. Id. at 237.
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the study." As a result, the studies produced by the group "tended to
be more descriptive than analytical. . .. "" But not "descriptive"
simply of formal legal rules. Rather, says Aaron, the studies
"reflected our perceptions of how the law actually works, as well as of
customs and practices that coexist with and affect the operation of
common and statutory law."18 The facticity of the UCLA studies-
"how the law actually works" - does distinguish them from many
comparative law studies of the period (and from some recent studies
as well). However, they still do not purport to investigate many of the
"unique ... social factors" that, according to Aaron's hypothesis,
determine "institutional arrangements" and their practical outcomes.
Nor can methodology be completely disaggregated from theory
or ideology. Aaron hypothesizes that he and his fellow labor law
professors were able "to work within a common framework of
research and discussion" more easily than other scholars "because we
tend to take a pragmatic view of the phenomena we are studying. '" 19
In the same spirit, he asserts that the group consciously "avoided
making value judgments" and that "discussions of the political
situation within any one country [have] always been conducted
cautiously, even delicately" because of the group's "remarkably
diverse" political makeup." Nonetheless, he concedes, "occasional
flare-ups" did occur. 20
Perhaps, as Aaron seems to imply, deference to political
sensibilities curtailed investigation of the very factors which his
hypothesis identified. Or perhaps, to the contrary, the "pragmatic
view" he ascribes to the group members stemmed from the fact that
they shared sufficient assumptions and values that in-depth
investigation of "social factors" seemed to be less than urgent. After
all, the group members came to prominence as scholars during the
post-war era and apparently subscribed to the then widely-held view
that workers should enjoy a degree of security in a mixed economy
(how much security and how mixed an economy would have been
debated); all apparently accepted that the historic mission of labor law
was to advance justice in the workplace (how much justice and by
what means would have been an issue); and all apparently believed-
why else collaborate?-that labor law's mission would be enhanced by
17. Id. at 236.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 237
20. One member of the group was described as a "conservative Gaullist," another as "an
ardent supporter . . . of the left wing of the British Labor Party" and the remainder as
"somewhere between the two." Aaron, supra note 6, at 236.
2007]
596 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 28:591
adding an outward-facing comparative and international dimension to
a corpus of scholarship which had been up to then largely self-
regarding and country-specific. Finally, all were prepared to work not
only across national boundaries - a political statement in itself - but
across legal traditions and, to an extent, across disciplinary
boundaries.21
Perhaps this is to say no more than that legal comparativism is
possible only when sufficient commonality exists so that the
comparator systems are mutually intelligible. If so, then perhaps the
intensifying crises of political economy, legal institutions, and legal
theory mentioned earlier may help to explain why the group
suspended its activities while it had yet another project under
consideration.22
In succeeding sections of this paper, I investigate this possibility,
in each case reflecting on the potential implications of traumatic
change for traditional comparative labor scholarship. I conclude by
speculating on what the new agenda of comparative labor law might
look like.
III. THE PARADIGM SHIFr IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LABOR
LAW
Each of the national systems encompassed in the UCLA studies
had been shaped by the long postwar recovery and embedded in some
version of the so-called postwar compromise. In each, workers
implicitly or explicitly accepted the primacy of the market economy in
exchange for higher living standards, increased access to public goods
and enhanced participation in decisions affecting the workplace.
However, as we know with hindsight, the UCLA project spanned the
period during which the post-war compromise began to deteriorate.
From the mid 1960s onward, the countries encompassed in the UCLA
studies began to experience accelerated technological change, the
restructuring of key industrial sectors, the growing importance of the
service sector, the expansion of knowledge-intensive work, and a new
workplace demographic in which women and other previously
excluded groups featured more prominently.
As a result, the paradigm of employment that underpinned much
postwar labor legislation in advanced economies became increasingly
21. However, they did not cross the final frontier: language. Aaron makes clear that facility
in English was required for all participants. Aaron, supra note 6, at 229.
22. Aaron assigns quite different reasons. Aaron, supra note 6, at 232.
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anachronistic.23 No longer could it be assumed that industrial
relations systems were populated primarily by semi-skilled white male
industrial workers employed by domestic companies, earning
relatively high salaries, enjoying lengthy job tenure, and receiving
social benefits built on that tenure and on the class and workplace
solidarity which tenure facilitated. No longer, therefore, could public
policy platforms, legal entitlements or union strategies be usefully
constructed on the old paradigm.
True, the nature of the new paradigm is even now not yet clear.
Which workers, doing what kind of work in which sector with what
attachment to the employment relationship should be identified as the
archetypal subjects of labor policy? Which employers in what country
at what remove from the direct control of the primary enterprise and
operating in what kind of labor markets should labor law regulate?
Which vision of social justice, whose aspirations, whose interests
should labor scholarship be concerned to protect? We know only that
the old paradigm is likely gone forever, not what will take its place.
During this same period, advanced industrial nations began to
suffer from rising and sometimes persistent unemployment, slower
growth, inflation, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods international
financial system, petro-shocks, the globalization of production and
financial markets, the faltering of social democracy, and the
resurgence of neo-liberalism. Most labor law scholars and
practitioners accept that as a result of these exogenous
developments-perhaps hastened by endogenous failures of social
theory, institutional design, political will, and legal logic-the "golden
era" of postwar industrial relations and labor law systems had come to
an end by, say, the mid 1970s. The timing and causes of systemic
failure no doubt varied somewhat from one country to another, and
according to one observer or another. However, putting aside exact
dates and precise diagnoses, by the time the last of the UCLA studies
had appeared, in the late 1970s, the emergence of a new regime of
accumulation and a new political dispensation had begun to wreak
profound changes in industrial relations and labor law, the effects of
which are only becoming fully evident decades later.
New variants of capitalism and state governance, new modes and
sites of production, and new alignments of political and social forces
have revised longstanding assumptions about the role states could and
23. K. Rittich, Vulnerability at Work: Regulatory and Policy issues in the New Economy
(Commissioned Report, the Law Commission of Canada, 2004); ALAIN SUPIOT, BEYOND
EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE (2001)
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should play in industrial relations. The trans-nationalization of
markets, enterprises, and work relations and new corporate strategies
of production, distribution, and management have given employers an
"exit option" and thereby shifted power from states and workers to
employers. New information, communications, and transportation
technologies have facilitated these changes, to the considerable
benefit of employers. However, they have not, so far, facilitated
worker resistance or adjustment to them. Indeed, in some respects
the potential for worker resistance has declined. Growing detachment
from class membership and consciousness, greater gender,
generational, racial, ethnic, locational, aspirational, and educational
diversity in the workforce, and more attenuated and ephemeral
relations amongst geographically dispersed workers with short-term
job tenure have all made worker solidarity more difficult to achieve
and further weakened the political and industrial power of workers.
The result, all the evidence suggests, has been a growing disparity
of wealth and power not only between employers and workers but
also amongst workers in different countries, economic sectors,
occupations, and demographic categories. Indeed, so great are these
disparities that "labor" is at risk of becoming anachronistic as a
credible category of social and political analysis, of cultural and
psychological significance, or of legislative and scholarly concern.24
Can a new, more equitable regime of labor law-comparable in
outcomes if not in architecture to the post-war compromise - be
established under such unfavorable conditions? The answer is not
obvious. To regulate labor relations in the global economy requires
effective rule-making and adjudicative bodies with transnational
jurisdiction; but no such bodies exist. To restore balance to domestic
labor policy requires a plausible philosophical or ideological premise
for the proposition that workers are entitled to social protection; but
no such premise so far commands widespread support. To revive
collective bargaining requires a labor movement that is willing and
able to use its political or industrial power to insist on its rights; but
labor movements are everywhere enfeebled and divided. And to
generate momentum for these developments requires the kind of
fundamental transformation in perceptions and values that is usually
triggered by a serious political or economic crisis; but no one would
24. Harry W. Arthurs, What Immortal Hand or Eye?- Who Will Redraw the Boundaries of
Labor Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOR LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE
REGULATION OF WORK 373 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2006).
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argue in favor of, say, a war or depression even if they might give rise
to a new and inspiring vision of labor law.
In other words, as the strong national labor law systems explored
by Aaron and his colleagues gradually withered away, a new and more
difficult question began to confront comparativists: How is it possible
to meaningfully "compare" labor laws and industrial relations systems
when the foundations of the old systems are eroding and their basic
values brought into question, when they are in rapid transformation
but at different stages, when familiar actors and institutions are being
replaced or revalorized, when familiar laws and processes are being
drained of meaning and new ones coming dramatically or
surreptitiously into force?
The answer to this question is that comparative labor law will
have to find new subjects for study. The likeliest place to find such
subjects is outside the familiar but degraded framework of state
legislation, administration, and adjudication.
IV. THE STATE WITHOUT LABOR LAW/LABOR LAW WITHOUT THE
STATE
Of course, certain crucial elements of labor law have always
existed outside the state legal system, on its periphery or in tension
with it.' However, the balance between state and non-state elements
has shifted significantly in favor of the latter because of the effects
upon state labor law of globalization, neo-liberalism, enhanced
technologies, and changing workplace demographics.
This shift would appear to be long-term, perhaps permanent.
States have committed themselves to global and regional trade
treaties, under which all forms of regulation are suspect as barriers to
cross-border trade, or, in the case of labor regulation, as adding
unacceptably to the cost of doing business. Moreover, treaties aside,
the doctrine of extraterritoriality prevents states from reaching down
transnational production and distribution chains to protect workers
offshore. Even though states clearly retain regulatory jurisdiction
over domestic labor markets, they may be unable to exercise it
effectively. Their regulatory capacity has been seriously impaired by
the long-term neo-liberal project of "shrinking the state"-of
retrenching its ambition, of reducing its financial cost, of shearing
away its powers, of diminishing the expectations of its clientele. This
project has sometimes been accomplished overtly by the repeal or
25. H.W. Arthurs, Labor Law without the State?, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1996).
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amendment of labor legislation, but more often by stealth; by
appointing unsympathetic tribunal members to administer labor
legislation; or by reducing the numbers, pay, zeal, and presence of
field staff charged with detecting or remedying violations. However
accomplished, the result is that it is no longer safe to assume that
states will enforce their existing labor laws domestically, much less
successfully adapt them for use in the new global context.
State labor law, finally, is increasingly made not by labor
departments, but in other ministries and agencies of state. Fiscal,
monetary, social welfare, education, immigration, and trade policies-
not labor statutes-determine structural and cyclical changes in the
labor market and their consequences for workers. In many countries,
even matters clearly denominated as "labor policy" no longer fall
within the mandate of a Ministry of Labor. They are now typically
assigned to larger, more generic ministries concerned either with
economic affairs or social affairs. As a result, it is increasingly unusual
for an influential Minister of Labor to sit at the cabinet table as an
advocate for labor's interests or even as the person charged with
curbing its power.26
As states divest themselves of the right to make labor law, the
means to enforce it, and the institutional capacity even to think about
it, the significance of non-state labor law is likely to grow
proportionately. Of course, labor lawyers will still have to concern
themselves with the vestigial remnants of the "common and statutory
law" of labor (Aaron's phrase) and, increasingly, with aspects of state
law and policy that originate in other policy domains but affect labor.
But more and more they are likely to be preoccupied with the
significant corpus of labor law that originates from sources other than
the state, and that is enforced elsewhere than in state tribunals.
If this is true, the implications for comparative labor law are
considerable. Comparisons amongst state labor law systems will
retain a certain antiquarian allure, but will shed little light on the
affinities and differences among the non-state regimes that
increasingly produce workplace norms and resolve workplace disputes
in the contemporary world. This suggests that the new focus of
comparative labor studies will be on "law without the state," on non-
state and supra-state systems.
This is by no means a radical prediction. The privatization of
policy- and rule-making, enforcement, and adjudication has been
26. Arthurs, supra note 24.
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27
widely noted in the domains of global business transactions,
administrative law,28 domestic disputes,29 the delivery of public goods
and services,3° technical standard setting,3 and penal facilities,32 to
name but a few. It could be said, then, that the expansion of the non-
state dimension of labor law is "normal" in the sense that it reflects a
more general trend in contemporary public, private, and, I predict,
comparative law. 33 Indeed, a question of particular interest to future
comparativists will surely be how these different regulation regimes
have survived their transformation from the public to the private
domain.
What might the new, privatized labor law look like and what will
comparativists have to compare? Corporate codes of conduct
governing employment practices are frequently cited as examples of
these new, non-state regimes. Many of these codes have been
developed with the encouragement of governments or international
bodies; some have been drafted with a degree of participation by
social movements and occasionally union bodies; a minority mandate
workplace audits and other measures designed to encourage
compliance; and a few may even have been successfully invoked to
improve the conditions of real workers in real workplaces.
Will future comparative labor scholars collect, contextualize, and
classify the codes of different corporations as they once did statutes
and doctrines of state law? From one perspective, this might seem an
odd thing to do. After all, for all their faults, state labor laws at least
claimed to empower workers. By contrast, corporate codes are clearly
not the product of worker agency nor do they encourage employee
voice on the shop floor; they are the product of employer self-interest
and invite acquiescence in employer self-regulation. They do not
represent an enforceable legal guarantee of employee rights; they
27. See, e.g., RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 273 (Richard P. Appelbaum, William F. Felstiner & Voklmar Gessner eds.,
2002).
28. See, e.g., David Mullan & Antonella Ceddia, The Impact on Public Law of Privatization,
Deregulation, Outsourcing, and Downsizing: A Canadian Perspective, 10 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD.
199 (2003); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285 (2003); Harry Arthurs, The Administrative State Goes to Market (and Cries "Wee,
Wee, Wee" All the Way Home), 55 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 797 (2005).
29. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (1992).
30. MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
(2003).
31. Liora Salter, The Housework of Capitalism: Standardization in the Communications
and Information Technology Sectors, 23 INT'L J. POL. ECON. 105 (1993-94).
32. RICHARD HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (1997); see B.
FORST & P.K. MANNING, THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICING: Two VIEWS (1999).
33. Harry W. Arthurs & Robert Kreklewich, Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal
Profession in the New Economy, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (1996).
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testify to the state's impotence or indifference. In short, corporate
codes do not curb employer power; they assume, legitimate, and
reinforce it and, at best, teach it good manners.34
Why then should comparativists concern themselves with such
codes? What might be the justification for comparing rules, processes,
and institutions that are not "legal" in the conventional sense, but that
fill the void left by the depletion of state labor law? Under the old
comparative law, there would be none. However, under the new
dispensation, where comparativism is committed to examining what is
actually happening in the real world, the argument in favor of
comparing corporate codes is a strong one.
Other practical projects and scholarly scenarios of non-state labor
law offer additional prospects for comparative scholarship. The
Global Compact launched in 2000 by the Secretary General of the
United Nations seeks to publicly commit the world's most prominent
corporations to respect core labor rights.35 The Ratcheting Labor
Standards (RLS) project proposes to enforce employer "best
practices" through the mobilization of public opinion and the
imposition of market sanctions.36 Other schemes seek to facilitate this
mobilization, and to enhance the effectiveness of non-state sanctions,
by requiring more complete information about where goods are
produced and under what conditions,37 by labeling goods which
originate in workplaces with high labor standards,38 by banning
substandard goods from the WTO global trading regime " by denying
producers of such goods access to government contracts, loan
34. See Harry W. Arthurs, Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the Global Economy:
Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labor Market Regulation, in LABOR LAW IN AN
ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES (Joanne
Conaghan, Richard Michael & Karl Klare eds., 2002); Adelle Blackett, Global Governance,
Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate
Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001).
35. The text may be found online at http://www.unglobalcompact.org.
36. Archon Fung, Dara O'Rourke & Charles Sabel, Realizing Labor Standards: How
Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions, BOSTON
REVIEW (Feb./Mar. 2001), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR26.1/fung.html; see also
Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourke & Archon Fung, Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for
Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace (2000), http://www2.1aw.columbia.edulsable/
papers/ratchPO.html.
37. See, e.g., D. Doorey, Who Made That? Influencing Foreign Labour Practices Through
Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353 (2005).
38. See, e.g., Janelle Diller, A Social Conscience in the Global Marketplace? Labour
Dimensions of Codes of Conduct, Social Labelling and Investor Initiatives, 138 INT'L LAB. REV.
99, 103 (1999); S. Zadek, S. Lingayah & M. Forstater, Social Labels: Civil Action Through the
Market, Paper by the New Economic Foundation for the European Commission (1998).
39. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 14
MINN. J. GLOB. TRADE 261 (2005).
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guarantees, or other benefits4" or by inciting shareholders to pressure
corporate management to improve labor practices.41
It is possible, if unlikely, that these schemes will materially
improve the rights, economic well-being, or dignity of workers.
However, they will certainly help to prepare labor law for its new role
as an exemplar of the powerful tendency towards non-state or
hybridized regimes of governance.42 Given that "law without the
state" has always been an important feature of labor law, in the new
dispensation it seems likely to become the dominant feature. How
can comparative labor law research fail to engage with non-state
regimes?
At the very least, comparativists will have to learn how to
investigate the structural and functional differences between the old
and the new regimes, between state and non-state systems of labor
law. Almost certainly, they will want to compare these new non-state
labor law systems to each other, hopefully not just in formal terms but
operationally as a way of assessing their efficacy, symbolic powers,
and relationship to adjacent systems of old- and new-style regulation.
And most intriguingly, comparisons amongst these diverse, semi-
autonomous, and often obscure systems may perhaps lead to the
emergence of the new syntax, grammar, and vocabulary of
comparativism, which will help to make them mutually intelligible. If
so, this will be a distinct contribution to both comparative and labor
law.
V. LEGAL THEORY WITHOUT THE STATE: LABOR LAW AND
COMPARATIVE LAW
However, the new focus of comparative labor law is not driven
solely by exogenous events. It owes much to recent movements in
legal and socio-legal theory and methodology as well.
40. For one recent unsuccessful attempt, see the Corporate Code of Conduct Act, HR 4596.
106th Cong (2000) introduced by Rep. Cynthia McKinney on June 2, 2000. Under Rep.
McKinney's proposal complying corporations would receive preferential treatment in the
awarding of federal contracts, participation in trade and development programs, and access to
loan guarantees and import-export credits.
41. See, e.g., Marleen O'Connor, Labor's Role in the American Corporate Governance
Structure, 22 COMP LAB L. & POL'Y J. 97 (2000). See also testimony of Daman A. Silvers,
Associate General Counsel AFL-CIO to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation (May 20, 2003) http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=767&wit-
id=2102.
42. For an imaginative attempt to situate this development in a positive light, see Orly
Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342 (2004).
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The past several decades have witnessed a considerable
expansion of efforts to describe and theorize, and less successfully, to
prescribe and implement, regimes of non-state norm production and
regulation. These efforts follow the century-long trajectory of legal
scholarship away from the traditional focus on the authoritative texts
and institutional architecture of state courts, legislatures, and
bureaucracies and beyond their traditional techniques of taxonomy
and exegesis. Recently, scholars have begun to map non-state
normativity more systematically, to show how all social fields tend to
generate their own distinctive legal norms and processes, how these
non-state legal regimes interact with each other as well as with state
law, how they exist often "in the shadow" of state law-even within
state institutions, and how they reinforce, deflect, and even transform
state law.43
This new interest in non-state normativity has particular
significance for theorizing about labor law. While mainstream legal
scholarship was focused almost exclusively on state legal institutions,
labor law had always been something of an exception in its
acknowledgement of other normative systems. Indeed, state labor law
has long incorporated significant elements of non-state law. Going
back to the beginning of the industrial revolution, trade custom and
usage served as the benchmark for "fair" wages and working
conditions." With the advent of a "free" labor market, the principles
of state contract law ostensibly dominated employment relations; but
these principles in reality served as a thin carapace under which
employers (always) and workers (rarely) fashioned the substantive
norms governing their relationship.
Even when state labor law was specifically invoked, workplace
disputes have long been decided outside of the regular courts. During
the first half of the nineteenth century, workers and employers in
several European countries began to resolve their disputes in
43. An eclectic list of recent important contributions includes Sally Falk Moore, Law and
Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. &
Soc. REV. 719 (1973); PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (1978); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms:
Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981); John Griffiths,
What is Legal Pluralism, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 2 (1986); P. Bourdieu The Force of Law:
Toward a Sociology of the Legal Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1987); Sally Engle Merry, Legal
Pluralism, 22 L. & Soc REV. 869 (1988); AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND
SOCIETY (Giinther Teubner ed., 1988); Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing Economic Life,
19 ECON. & SOC'Y 1 (1990); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW COMMON
SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995); RODERICK
MACDONALD, LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW (2002).
44. See, e.g., E.P. Thompson The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth
Century, 50 PAST & PRESENT 76 (1971).
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arbitration, conciliation, and other informal non-state forums.45 In
North America, from the early twentieth century, private arbitration
was widely used by unionized workers to enforce collective
agreements," a practice which took on ironic significance recently as
American employers began to require unorganized workers to seek
recourse for violation of their statutory labor rights through
arbitration, rather than in state forums.4" Even when jurisdiction to
administer state labor law was clearly assigned to state forums,
specialized state labor courts or tribunals were typically selected for
the task, rather than regular courts whose personnel and processes
were demonstrably ill-suited to perform it.
Moreover, many contemporary studies have shown that the law
of the workplace is still largely generated from within, in the form of
collective agreements; arbitral jurisprudence; operating manuals;
customs governing workplace demeanor; low visibility sanctions that
determine the pace and intensity of work; racialized, gendered, and
inter-generational understandings concerning who does what jobs;
and a myriad of invisible norms that are (in E.P. Thompson's phrase)
imbricated in the routines of production.48
Even labor law practitioners must by now have come to accept
that state legal regimes established to improve the status of workers
often yield disappointing outcomes. Despite the Wagner Act,
American workers are still (again!) unable to join unions and bargain
collectively. Despite anti-discrimination statutes, women and racial
minorities are far from having achieved equality in the workplace.
Despite labor standards legislation, serious exploitation and abuse
persist in parts of the service sector and in clandestine sweatshops.
Despite international conventions to protect core labor rights,
acceded to by national governments, the reality of working life in
developing countries falls far short of what might be expected. And
despite the claim that all citizens are equal before the law, many
regimes of ordinary state law-tort, contract, intellectual property,
45. Bi-partite Conseils de prudhommes were established in France in 1806 and continue to
function today; arbitration in England had been practiced from the 1840s onward and was well
established by the end of the nineteenth century; and successful systems of arbitration had taken
root in the United States by about 1920. J. Jaffe, Industrial Arbitration, Equity and Authority in
England 1800-1850, 18 L. & HIST. REV. 525 (2000).
46. EDWIN E. WIFIE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR ARBITRATION (1952).
47. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENVER UNIV. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
48. See H.W. Arthurs, Understanding Labour Law: The Debate Over 'Industrial Pluralism',
38 CURR. LEG. PROB. 83 (1985); H.W. Arthurs, 'Landscape and Memory': Labor Law, Legal
Pluralism and Globalization, in ADVANCING THEORY IN LABOR LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
(T. Wilthagen ed., 1997).
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taxation, insurance, and human rights law-have produced outcomes
that favor the interests of employers rather than workers.
For these historical and practical reasons, labor law scholars and
practitioners had to acknowledge the existence and legitimacy of non-
state or hybrid systems of law and dispute resolution much earlier
than their professional colleagues in other fields. And for much the
same reasons, social scientists exploring non-state normativity in
industrialized societies drew on the experience of labor law in some of
their early work.4 9 Comparativists, to come belatedly to the point, can
hardly fail to follow their lead.
VI. COMPARED TO WHAT? THE FUTURE OF COMPARATIVE LABOR
LAW
Comparative labor law is obviously affected by these
developments in political economy, regulatory technology, and socio-
legal theory. Comparativists often argue that the principal "use" of
their subject is that "it gives us a different perspective from which to
view [our country]. As a consequence, we ask different questions
about our own system. ,, 0 This prevents "an attitude that tends to
take [one's] own system for granted, even for superior .... In this
respect, comparative law is an exercise in developing modesty."'"
Note: comparative law is not unique in this respect; it has much in
common with an interdisciplinary approach to law. Comparing "law
on the books" with "law in practice," for example, also demands that
we acquire "a different perspective," that we develop "modesty" in
our claims about law.
However, the achievement of "perspective" or of "modesty" in
labor law is not an end in itself: it is a project with a purpose. What is
that purpose? Not just to map labor law more accurately to facilitate
domestic navigation or foreign tourism, but to bring into clearer focus
the forces that shape labor law "in practice" as well as labor law "on
the books." What are those forces? Not "legal tradition" in itself as
some comparativists suggest, nor the history and sociology of
49. See, e.g., Bourdieu, supra note 43; Moore, supra note 43; PHILIP SELZNICK, PHILIPPE
NONET & H. VOLLMER, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Gunther Teubner,
Industrial Democracy Through Law, in TERENCE DAINTITH & GONTHER TEUBNER CONTRACT
AND ORGANIZATION: LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY
(1986); JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF
LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTI-TRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
50. Aaron, supra note 6, at 234.
51. Manfred Weiss, The Future of Comparative Labor Law as an Academic Discipline and
as a Practical Tool, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 169, 178 (2003).
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enterprises or trade unions as others propose, nor even the conceptual
vocabulary that defines the way we think and talk about such things.
Rather, the dynamic forces that must be brought into focus are those
that delegitimate tradition, re-write history, destabilize society, and
transform law: political economy, ideology, technology, and culture.
And how does comparativism bring those forces into focus? Not by
the simple scientific cataloguing of difference or dissonance, but by
exposing us to the psychological shock of encountering "the other," in
much the same way as voyages of discovery in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries helped to create the new, critical sensibility of
enlightenment and revolution.
Now a methodological warning. To consider the operation of
political economy, ideology, technology, and culture only within the
optic of their effects on state labor law, "on the books" or "in
practice," is to truncate or distort our understanding of these same
forces. To assume that state labor law can be disaggregated from
them, is to underestimate their power and to overestimate the
autonomy of law. And to assume that law's unique epistemology,
deontology, and logic provide a useful vantage point from which to
comprehend and evaluate these other forms of social ordering is to
persist in a conceit that we should long since have abandoned.
To recapitulate, comparative law, including comparative labor
law, faces a two-fold challenge. It must begin to consider both state
and non-state normative regimes; and it must acknowledge that
normativity is shaped by social forces rather than the reverse. In fact,
comparativists have already begun a root-and-branch reconsideration
of the fundamental epistemological, methodological, ethical, and
political assumptions of their profession." As a result, the classical
project of comparative law, to compare legal rules and systems, seems
even more problematic than it once did.
Suppose, for example, that we wished to compare the way in
which different labor law systems regulate "strikes," enforce
''agreements," or define which "employees" are covered by particular
kinds of legislation -standard items on the agenda of comparative
labor law. Do we begin by listing the institutional characteristics,
procedures, or substantive rules of the labor law systems of
comparator countries? Or do we begin with prior, some might say
"political," considerations? Should we not acknowledge that buried
52. See especially Gunther Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative
Law, 26 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 411 (1985); Symposium on New Approaches to Comparative Law,
1997 UTAH L. REV. 255 (1997); Annelise Riles, Whigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in
the Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 221 (1999).
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in words such as "strike," "agreement," or "employee" are hotly
contested and culturally contingent assumptions-that "strikes" are to
be treated differently from other refusals to deal, that "agreements"
are to be obeyed, that "employment" is a category that entails special
rights and duties? Or at an even more fundamental level, should we
not acknowledge that to inquire how "the law" deals with these issues
in (say) Germany, America, and Brazil is deeply "lego-centric"?53
Lego-centricity assumes what is often most contestable: that law is an
unqualified social good; that law has an autonomous existence; that
law produces the optimal resolution of conflicts; that law's legitimacy
and power exceed that of other processes and institutions, such as
markets, social mobilization, or long-term cultural change; and that
the evocative power of "law" is constant across these countries.
Of course, comparative labor law will likely remain lego-centric
for some time to come. We will continue to explore differences
amongst the institutions, processes, and rules of national labor law
systems. These have a nostalgic appeal; they remind us of when we
and our subject were both much younger. They are intrinsically
important because, like the Rosetta Stone or the Burgess Shale, they
allow us to revisit a vanished world of which only vestigial traces
remain. And, in fairness, comparative labor law generates practical
(or perhaps placebo-like) effects. So long as people continue to
believe in the power of law to do good, comparative examples from
"relevant other" states will liberate them from the tyranny of the
status quo, and remind them that existing legal values are contestable,
that legal rules are malleable, and that legal architecture is wrought by
human hands, not by fate or nature.
Still, the center of gravity in comparative labor law scholarship is
shifting away from national industrial relations and labor law systems.
Given the declining ability and growing disinclination of states to
intervene in labor markets, diminishing returns are available from the
cataloguing of formal or structural differences amongst these
systems,54 debating the methodological difficulties of making
functional comparisons amongst them,55 or hypothesizing the
circumstances under which labor laws might be "transplantable" from
53. Gunther Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV.
INT'L. L. J. 411,433 (1985).
54. See, e.g., ROY J. ADAMS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS UNDER LIBERAL DEMOCRACY:
NORTH AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1995).
55. See, e.g., William Twining, Social Science and the Diffusion of Law, 32 J.L. & SOC. 203
(2005).
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one country to another.56 Nor is it particularly useful to ask similar
questions at the international level. True, normative principles
governing relations between employers and workers may be written
into international covenants and conventions on human or labor
rights, inscribed in declaratory protocols on proper standards of
corporate conduct or embedded in other "soft law" initiatives. But it
is even less productive to attempt to compare like with like in the
international domain than in domestic law.57 Even at the level of
textual analysis, international labor law texts-where they exist-tend
to be fragmentary, vague, admonitory, unenforceable and unenforced.
Instead, comparative labor law will have to be conceived and
executed as part of a more general investigation of the effects of
different systems of global and regional political economy and
governance. 8 Trade regimes-the WTO, NAFTA, the EU-may not
deal directly with labor law to any significant extent, but they do have
profound consequences for labor markets and hence for relations
between employees and employers. The task of comparative labor
lawyers will be increasingly to trace out the chain of causation, to
show how different regimes of transnational economic integration
alter public policies, empower or dis-empower state and non-state
actors, transform analytical discourse, revise expectations and above
all, trigger substantive changes in economies in general, in broad labor
markets and in workplace relations within individual enterprises.59
There are more quotidian comparisons to make as well. If most
workers no longer have effective union representation, are they
inventing new strategies for the defense of their interests? For
example, statistics suggest that in the United States, more private
sector workers may be enrolled in non-union employee associations
56. See, e.g., Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.
REV. 1 (1974); Christopher J. Whelan, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Labor Law, 45
MOD. L. REV. 285 (1982); Thomas C. Kohler, The Disintegration of Labor Law: Some Notes for
a Comparative Study of Legal Transformation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1311 (1998); Bob
Hepple, Can Collective Labor Law Transplants Work? The South African Example, 20 INDUS.
L.J. 1 (1999).
57. See, e.g., Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back- Or Vice Versa: Labor
Rights Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America,
and Beyond, 37 UNIV. S.F. L. REV. 689 (2003). Indeed, the exercise may provoke spectacular
disagreements, see Philip Alston, 'Core Labour Standards' and the Transformation of the
International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 4571 (2004); Brian Langille, Core
Labour Standards-The True Story (Reply to Alston), 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 409 (2005); Philip
Alston, Facing up to the Complexities of the ILO'S Core Labor Standards Agenda, 16 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 467 (2005).
58. David Kennedy New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and
International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545 (1997).
59. For a pioneering effort, see Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second
Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 199 (2004).
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than in conventional unions. How do the normative systems
generated by these associations compare with those generated
through collective bargaining? Studies have documented the
emergence of technology-assisted employee "caucuses" or networks
that enable professionals and knowledge workers with common
interests to share information and act in parallel, if not in concert.
How do their objectives and outcomes compare to with those of
employee associations in other, contexts? Conventional industrial
action is often unavailable to workers in the global south. However,
their allies and sympathizers in the global north have devised
unconventional strategies to enhance their bargaining power-
consumer boycotts and shareholder complaints, for example. How do
these conventional and unconventional strategies compare in terms of
short-term efficacy, long-term sustainability, counter-measures by
employers, and impacts on worker solidarity? Employees fired by
employers determined to achieve a flexible, non-union work force
may seek redress by reinventing themselves as victims of unsafe
working conditions, racial discrimination, or sexual harassment. What
is there about these alternative forms of recourse that might enhance
their attractiveness in given situations?
Comparisons within and amongst firms are also important. To
what extent, by what means, and under what circumstances do
different firms or parts of firm engage in what, in a very different
context, has been called "the reproduction of legality."6 That is to
say, to what extent do they create their own distinctive norm-
promulgating and dispute-resolving regimes outside the state legal
system, but nonetheless in some respects consciously or unconsciously
imitating it? Who are the effective actors in constituting these non-
state regimes? Who plays the significant compliance-instigating and
dispute-resolving roles once assigned by statute to state tribunals or
labor inspectors? At what level within transnational corporations, do
indigenous regimes originate, and to what extent do they reflect local
or head office culture? Are they spontaneous or the result of a
calculated, long-term HR strategy? How do they interact with state
law? Do they whet the appetite for more conventional forms of
regulation or do they satisfy that appetite? Do corporate officials who
administer indigenous labor law regimes do so cynically or do they
find themselves gradually co-opted into trying to make them work?
And most importantly, what are their practical outcomes in terms of
60. Boaventura de Sousa Santos The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and
Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada, 12 LAW & Soc REV. 5 (1977).
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improving labor standards? These are questions that can only be
answered by comparative inquiry-but inquiry with a strong empirical
component.
Or to take one more set of examples: How do new discourses of
industrial relations, new paradigms of employment, new
configurations of production, new approaches to governance actually
reshape state labor law systems in different countries, companies, and
contexts? To what extent are states actually changing the "policy
platform" on which labor laws have traditionally been constructed?
Does the new, cooperative "human capital" model produce different
attitudes amongst workers and employers from those produced by the
conflictual model that has prevailed for most of the modern history of
labor law? If so, have those attitudes found institutional and
behavioral expression in state and non-state contexts or do they
remain merely rhetorical? If they have produced new legal
technologies-social drawing rights, flexicurity, the open method of
coordination-are the rights promulgated, promoted, or protected by
these technologies in addition to or in lieu of more conventional
perquisites of employment, such as higher wages and job tenure? If
they have led to the establishment of new workplace institutions, are
these in addition to or in lieu of changes at the highest levels of
corporate governance? And have new labor law institutions inspired
by the positive promise of human capital theories generated as their
unpleasant corollary multi-level labor law systems that favor
knowledge workers and disfavor unskilled and semi skilled workers?
In short, the project of comparative labor law will become part of an
intellectually ambitious and highly complex study of the changing
political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological terrain of work
relations.
"It is magnificent," a French general said, upon witnessing the
charge of the Light Brigade, "but is it war?" You might fairly ask the
same of me. I have described a magnificent project: but is it
comparative labor law?61 I think I can make a good argument that it
is. It is "law" in the sense that it deals with issues of normativity. It
concerns "labor" in the sense that it addresses relations between
people who work and those who for whom work is performed. And it
is "comparative" in the sense that it asks questions about alternative
values, perceptions, actions, and arrangements-those sponsored by
the state and those that have some other provenance, those that we
61. Cf Miguel Rodrfguez-Pifiero Royo, What Do We Talk About When We Talk About
Labor Law?, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 701 (2002).
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experience close up and those that operate at a distance in time or
space, those that fit neatly within established concepts and categories
and those that do not. If this is an accurate description of the new
comparative labor law, in practical terms, it will be impossible to be a
labor lawyer without being a comparativist.
We will all become labor lawyers sans frontiOres. This is a
metaphor worth pursuing. As everyone knows, m~dicins sans
frontires is a humanitarian agency with a reputation for improvising
solutions in conditions of extreme turmoil and bitter conflict. The
allusion is especially attractive to labor lawyers who like to believe
that they are engaged in a similar enterprise. But labor lawyers, like
all lawyers, have traditionally operated avec frontieres-within
professional, jurisdictional, and conceptual boundaries that are
defined by their legal training, competence, culture, and mandate.
When they step outside those boundaries-as they do when they
become comparativists -they tend to do so diffidently. And with
good reason. After all, they are being admonished to be sure to
consider law in its context. But if there are no frontieres then
everything is context; and if everything is context, nothing is law.
A confession, then. I seem to have hoisted myself on my own
paradox. Or, more accurately, I have painfully rediscovered a truth
that Aaron and his colleagues discovered forty years ago. Their
pioneering studies on strikes, employment discrimination, and
dismissal from employment did not deny the crucial relevance of
context. But they felt obliged to write primarily about the rules and
institutions of state labor law rather than, as their central
preoccupation, about context. Context, for them, was too vague, too
complex, too bound up with history and culture and politics. The
large question that will determine the fate of comparative labor law
scholarship is therefore this: Can we develop a new intellectual
framework, can we muster the intellectual resources, can we recruit
the array of intellectual talents needed to do comparative labor law as
we know, as Aaron and his colleagues knew, it ought to be done, in all
its breadth and depth and complexity?
